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Gradual Spread of Market-Led Industrialization
Jeffrey D. Sachs and Xiaokai Yang
1. Introduction
The purpose of the paper is threefold. First, it formalizes one branch of high development
economics which describes industrialization as a market led gradual spreading process. Second,
it investigates effects of transaction conditions, which are affected by geography, institutions,
and transportation and communication technology, on gradual spread of industrialization.
Finally, this paper devises a new method to handle the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny model (1989).
This new method will extend applicability of this model to the analysis of many trade and
development phenomena. Let us motivate the three tasks one by one.
Since the end of the 1980s, many general equilibrium models with increasing returns
have been developed to formalize what is called by Krugman (1995) “high development
economics.” There are two different views in high development economics. One is referred to as
the theory of big push and balanced industrialization, represented by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943)
and Nurkse (1952). The other is referred to as the theory of unbalanced industrialization,
represented by Fleming (1954) and Hirschman (1958). When economists were not familiar with
technical substance of general equilibrium models, they can only use vague words to address
general equilibrium phenomena, such as circular causation, interdependent decisions in different
industries, pecuniary externality of industrial linkages, and so on.
In essence, Rosenstein-Rodan’s idea (1943) about big push industrialization is to advocate
for state led industrialization because of coordination failure in exploiting network effects of
industrial linkages in a decentralized market. This idea is formalized by the MSV model with the2
feedback loop between the extent of the market and economies of scale that can be exploited.
Hirschman’s idea (1958) about pecuniary externality of industrial linkages relates more or less to
market led industrialization since the network effects of industrial linkages are pecuniary (which
can be exploited by the price system). Term "balanced vs. unbalanced industrialization" may be
misleading. Unbalanced industrialization strategy may be associated with specialization of a
country in a particular sector and international division of labor between countries. Hence, from
a view of the world market, such a strategy is a balanced industrialization strategy, although it is
not balanced within a single country (Sheahan, 1958). We shall extend the MSV model to
formalize Hirschman's idea on market led gradual spread of industrialization.
Casual observation indicates that industrialization was gradually spread from the UK to
Netherlands and France, then to Germany and other central and north European countries, and
finally reached south Europe and the rest of the world. In Asia, industrialization started in Japan
in the end of 19
th century, then gradually spread to Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea,
and other Asian countries.
The observed gradual spread of industrialization is affected by transaction conditions.
There are three major determinants of transaction conditions: institutions, geography, and
technology. Industrialization started in the island countries, then spread to coastal regions of the
continent, then to hinterland countries. It was so in Europe in the 18
th and 19
th century (the UK is
an island country, Netherlands and France are in coastal region, and Germany and other central
European countries are hinterland countries) and in Asia in the 19
th and 20
th century (Japan and
Taiwan are island countries, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea are in coastal region,
China and India are continental countries with vast hinterland areas).3
Effects of institutions on transaction conditions and thereby on economic development
have been investigated by North (1981), North and Weingast (1989), Mokyr (1990, 1993), and
others. Gallup and Sachs (1998) provide empirical evidences for effects of geography on
transportation conditions and thereby on economic development. They use cross country data to
show that the population share of coast region and distance from the major international market
have very significant impact on per capital income.
Institutions and geography are not independent of each other. Baechler (1976, pp. 78-80)
notes that geographical conditions of Europe created a variety of polity and rivalry between
hostile sovereigns within the same cultural whole in Europe, which encouraged many different
institutional experiments. A particular geographical condition ensured that Britain could avoid
war with other countries at low defense expenses and had transportation advantage for trade.
Pursuit of riches was legitimated under the prevailing ideology, so that talents were diverted
from military, religious, and bureaucratic careers to business activities prior to and during the
Industrial Revolution.
Geography affects economic development also via its connection to climate and public
health conditions. One of the most important patterns of international development is the large
and secularly rising gap in incomes between temperate and tropical economies. This gap is
largely unexplained in the literature, and thus constitutes one of the greatest intellectual puzzles
in development economics. The general mode of explanation is that the tropics lags the
temperate zone because of political reasons. In Marxist theory, the exploitation of the tropics by
temperate zone economies during the colonial era, and the continuing exploitation through post-
colonial dependency, lies at the heart of explanation. In much neoclassical speculation, the
tropical zone economies are poorly governed, with a lack of property rights and with predation4
by the state. Why "good" governments should be found in the temperate zone and "bad"
governments in the tropics is left unexplained. Another way of thinking is that the political
patterns (to the extent that they exist) are outcomes rather than fundamental causes of the income
differences. In this view, the tropics were conquered by the temperate zones because of some
more basic advantages in the temperate zone. The poor governments in the tropics are a result of
poverty, rather than a cause.
There are some deep reasons for higher food productivity in the temperate zones than in
the tropics. In cases where food crops cross ecological lines (wheat in the temperate and sub-
tropical zones; rice and maize in the temperate, sub-tropical, and tropical zones), intrinsic
productivity is almost always higher in the temperate regions. This productivity advantage has
been related to fundamental conditions of net photosynthetic potential, soils, and hydrology.
With regard to public health, the main difference in regions lies in the prevalence of vector-borne
diseases. Most disease agents (bacteria, viruses, other parasites) require living conditions in
warm environments, specifically, at temperatures near that of the human body itself. Some
disease agents can be transmitted directly between persons (e.g. tuberculosis, which is
transmitted by aerosols in human breath), but many others are transmitted by an animal vector
(i.e. intermediate animal host). Such vectors, in the case of flies (e.g. trypanosomiasis), or
mosquitoes (e.g. malaria and yellow fever), or snails (e.g. schistosomiasis) are usually highly
dependent on warm temperatures for survival and infectivity. Other parasites transmitted
between persons partly through a phase outside of the body or another host (e.g. in the ground, in
the case of helminths), and so too must be transmitted in a warm environment in order to survive.
Gallup and Sachs (1998) provide empirical evidences that the countries in the temperate
regions outperform those in the tropic regions. In the current paper, we will identify a general5
equilibrium mechanism that dictates the interplay between climate and other geographical
conditions, transaction conditions, and economic development.
In the paper, we will introduce asymmetric production conditions between firms and
asymmetric transaction conditions between countries into the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny (MSV)
model of industrialization (1989). In the MSV model competitive market is compatible with
economies of scale (see also Rosen, 1983 and Yang and Ng, 1998 for a discussion on
compatibility between increasing returns and competitive market) and its algebra is easy to
manage. The feedback loops between the extent of the market, dividend earnings, economies of
scale that can be exploited, and quantities demanded nicely formalize a general equilibrium
mechanism that can talk to circular causation, network effects of industrial linkages, and
interdependence between production and market conditions and decisions in different sectors,
which concerned high development economists.
There is some technical difficulty of this kind of models that restricts its broad
application. The price of the goods produced by the active modern sectors is a constant,
determined by the zero profit condition of cottage firms with constant returns to scale
technology. This paralyzes the functioning of the price system to transmit information of the
production condition of the modern firms to consumers. Hence, the number of modern sectors
cannot be endogenized by using the zero profit condition. Kelly (1997) introduces the trade off
between economies of scale and transaction costs into the MSV model to endogenize the number
of modern sectors. Because of zero profit condition, consumers’ utility does not go up as the
number of modern sectors increases in that model. If the assumption of positive profit is
maintained to keep the flavor of feedback loop between the extent of the market and economies
of scale, the model is short of one equation to endogenize the number of modern sectors.6
In this paper, we develop an analytical approach to specifying a zero profit condition for
a marginal modern firm, while keeping positive profit for other active modern firms. Following
Kelly, we specify the trade off between economies of scale and transaction costs to endogenize
the number of active modern versus traditional sectors. This approach keeps the original flavor
of the MSV model: interdependence between the extent of the market and economies of scale,
and compatibility between competitive market and global economies of scale. A key ingredient
that makes this approach work is asymmetry of production conditions between different modern
firms and asymmetry of transaction conditions between countries. This new approach to handle
the MSV model will make this model more applicable to the analysis of many problems in
economic development, trade, urbanization, and industrial organization.
The introduction of the trade off between economies of scale that can be exploited and
transaction costs can accommodate empirical evidence that is at odds with the MSV model. The
MSV model predicts that a large population size has a positive effect on industrialization. But the
first country that was industrialized (UK) was not the most populous country (China). Empirical
evidences provided in National Research Council (1986) and Dasgupta (1995) reject this type of
scale effect. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) suggest to introduce transaction costs to
counteract the scale effect. Our model will substantiate their idea and show that there exists
substitution between population size and transaction conditions in promoting industrialization and
economic development and that a large country can be locked in the development trap if its
transaction conditions are very bad.
In section 2, equilibrium and comparative statics of the extended MSV model are solved.
We then extend the model to the case with many countries to endogenize a dual structure7
between integrated developed world and autarkic less developed world in section 3. In addition,
a dynamic version of the model is considered. The final section concludes the paper.
2. An Extended Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny Model of Industrialization
Consumers' decisions.
Following MSV, we assume that the set of consumption goods produced by the industrial sector
is a continuum with mass m. Each consumer-worker-owner has a Cobb-Douglas-CES utility
function. Her decision problem is:







 p(j)x(j)dj + pzz = I = (p+w).
where j˛[0, m] is an index of industrial goods, x(j) is the quantity of good j consumed, p(j) is the
price of good j, z is the quantity of agricultural good consumed, pz is the price of the agricultural
good. Each consumer endowed with one unit of labor has income I which consists of dividend
earning p and wage income w.  Labor is assumed to be the numeraire, so that w = 1. Ownership
of all firms is equally shared by all consumers. Later, we shall show that in equilibrium p(j) = 1
for all j. Hence, the optimum quantity demanded of good j is the same for all j. Using the
symmetry, the solution to the problem (1) can be found as follows.
x = aI/m, z = (1-a)I/pz
The total market demand is:
(2) X
d = aIL/m = a(P+L)/m, Z
d
 = (1-a)(P+L)/pz, P = pL.
where P is total dividend earning which is equal to total profit. We now consider the production
of z. The production function of z is
(3) Z = qLz8
where q  is an agricultural productivity parameter, Lz is the amount of labor allocated to the
production of z. The equilibrium price of good z is thus pz = 1/q and the equilibrium quantity of
good z consumed and produced is then Z = (1-a)q(P+L).
Production of Industrial Goods
For each industrial good, there are two available technologies. The modern one exhibits
economies of scale and the traditional one is xh = Lhx, xh is the output of a traditional (cottage or
handcraft) sector and Lhx is the amount of labor allocated to this sector. Because of the existence
of the traditional technology, the labor prices of all industrial goods are always 1, so that the
quantity demanded is the same for all industrial goods. If we specify an iceberg transaction cost
coefficient 1-t for each goods produced by the modern sectors and purchased by a consumer, and
assume that this cost coefficient is 0 if all manufacturers in the modern sectors reside in the city
and is positive if they have dispersed residences, then it can be shown that all manufacturers in
the modern sectors always reside in the city in equilibrium. Hence, the population share of urban
residents equals the employment share of modern sectors.
The production function of the modern sector producing good j is
(4) xj = (Lj-Fj)/b , F0 = d, Fj = gj > d for j ˛ (0, m].
where xj is the quantity supplied, Lj is the amount of labor allocated to the production of the
industrial good, and Fj is the fixed production cost of good j. We assume that the fixed cost
differs across modern sectors and that the industrial goods are indexed according to their fixed
costs. Industrial good 0 has the smallest fixed cost d, which is a very small positive number,
industrial good m has the largest fixed cost gm, and for j ˛ (0, m], Fj = gj ˛ (d, gm]. Here, g can
be considered as a general production condition parameter. As g decreases, the fixed cost for any9
modern sector j decreases. Also, Fj can be interpreted as the degree of capital intensity. A large
value of Fj implies that the modern sector j needs a high investment in fixed cost before a
positive output can be produced. Hence, index j can be considered as an index of capital intensity
of the modern sectors.
We assume further that there is a variable transaction cost for each modern firm. The
transaction condition differs across countries. The transaction cost incurred to a modern firm in
country i is
(5) Ci = cixj, c0 = s, ci = mi > s for i ˛ (0, M].
where i ˛ [0, M] is an index of countries, s, a very small positive number, is the transaction cost
coefficient for country 0, and xj is the output level of modern sector j which is the same in any
country and in any sector as we have shown. The set of countries can be either a continuum or a
finite set {0, 1, …, M}. The specification implies that two factors determine the transaction cost
coefficient: a general transaction condition m and country specific transaction condition
represented by index i. for a larger i, the transaction cost coefficient ci is larger.
1 A country's
geographical condition and institutional and cultural tradition determines its ranking index i. For
any given i, the transaction cost coefficient ci decreases as m decreases. A decrease in m can be
caused by worldwide changes in transportation technology or institutions. We may consider
country 0 as the most developed country and country M as the most underdeveloped country.
The profit of firm j in country i is
(6) pij = xj -Lj-cixj = (1-mi-b)xj-gj
                                                          
1 We take the transaction cost coefficient as a black box. The literature of endogenous transaction cost has opened
the black box and shown that moral hazard, adverse selection, and other opportunism may generate endogenous
transaction costs. See Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Hart (1995), and Holmstrom and Roberts (1998).10
where xj = X
d is determined by the demand function given in (2). Total dividend earning is equal
to total profit of n active modern firms.
(7) P = ￿0
npijdj
where n ˛[0, m] is endogenously determined. Plugging this expression for total dividend earning
into (2), total market demand for the good produced by firm j can be found as
(8) xj = a(P+L)/m
where the number of all industrial goods is m, the number of active traditional sectors is m–n.
(6)-(8) nicely captures the feedback loop between income, demand, and production conditions. It
also captures the idea of big push industrialization. If the transaction cost is 0, as more modern
firms operate (n increases), dividend earning and income increases, demand increases, which
makes more modern firms profitable. Hence, as the population size reaches a threshold level, the
equilibrium number of modern sectors, n, jumps from 0 to its upper bound m (see Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989). But in our model, transaction costs counteract the positive feedback
between the extent of the market and economies of scale that can be exploited, so that
industrialization may occur gradually as the transaction conditions are improved.
Inserting (8) into (6), then inserting the resulting expression into (7), we can conduct
integration and then express total income P+L as a function of n.
(9) P+L = (L-0.5gn
2)m/[m-an(1-b-mi)]
where L-0.5gn
2> 0 and m-an(1-b-mi)]> 0 are required by positive income. We now consider the
zero profit condition for the most capital intensive active modern sector n. Letting j equal n in (6)
and pn = 0, we get the zero profit condition, pn = (1-b-mi)xj-gn = 0. Inserting the demand function,
given in (8), into the zero profit condition for the marginal active modern firm generates another
expression of P+L.11
(10) P+L = gmn/(1-b-mi)a.
where 1-b-mi > 0 is required by positive income. (9) and (10) together give the equilibrium
number of active modern firms n as a function of parameters g, m, L, b, i, a.
2
(11) f (n, g, m, L, b, i, a) = a(L+0.5gn
2)(1-b-mi)- gmn = 0
(11) is a quadratic equation of n which can be rearranged as f(n) = An
2-Bn+D = 0, where A,B,D
are positive. The graph of this equation in the first and forth quadrants of the n-f coordinates is a
convex curve cutting the vertical axis above the horizontal axis since f(0) = D > 0,  f ' (0) = -B <
0, f '' (n) = 2A > 0. The unique minimum point n = B/2A > 0 of this curve is given by f ' (n) = 0.
Hence, this curve may have two cutting points of the right half horizontal axis, which means two
equilibria, given by f(n*) = 0. Call the two solutions of f(n) = 0 n1 and n2, respectively, and
assume n2 > n1. Hence, we can see that
f ' (n1) < 0 and f ' (n2) > 0 for a convex curve with the unique minimum point that is below the
horizontal axis. But we can show that for a positive income, ¶f/¶n = agn(1-b-mi)-gm < 0 must
hold since positive income in (9) requires m-an(1-b-mi)>0. This implies that n2 cannot be an
equilibrium. We have then established the claim that there is only one equilibrium in this model.
3
Differentiating (11) and using the implicit function theorem, we can identify the
comparative statics of the equilibrium number of active modern firms.
(12) dn/dL = -(¶f/¶L)/(¶f/¶n) > 0, dn/dm = -(¶f/¶m)/(¶f/¶n) < 0,
dn/db = -(¶f/¶b)/(¶f/¶n) < 0, dn/di = -(¶f/¶i)/(¶f/¶n) < 0.
where ¶f/¶n = agn(1-b-mi)-gm < 0 and ¶f/¶g = 0.5an
2(1-b-mi)-mn < 0 because the positive
income in (9) requires m-an(1-b-mi)>0, ¶f/¶b, df/di, ¶f/¶m < 0, ¶f/¶L > 0. (12) implies that there
                                                          
2 The market clearing condition for labor is not independent of (9) and (10) according to Walras' law. Hence, it can
be used to check if the algebra is correct. Indeed, inserting the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables and
transaction costs in terms of labor into this market clearing condition for labor confirms that it is the same as (9).12
is substitution between transaction conditions and population size in promoting industrialization.
For a given m, a larger population size generates a higher degree of industrialization. For a given
L, better general transaction conditions generate a higher degree of industrialization. dn/di < 0
implies that the degree of industrialization is lower for a country with the larger transaction cost
coefficient which implies a larger i. This implies that a large country may have low degree of
industrialization if its transaction conditions are very bad.
General equilibrium and comparative statics
The general equilibrium in country i is summarized as follows.
(13) px = 1, pz = 1/q  Lz = (1-a)(P+L),








(P/L)+1 = gmn/a(1-b-mi)L, and
n is given by f = a(L+0.5gn
2)(1-b-mi)- gmn = 0
where U is per capita real income (equilibrium utility level), (P/L)+1 is per capita income in
terms of labor, Lx is the amount of labor allocated to all active modern firms, and R ” Lx/L
represents the degree of urbanization. Differentiating U in (13) and using (11) and (12), it can be
shown that
(14) dU/dL > 0, and dU/dm < 0, dR/dL > 0, dR/dm < 0,
dn/dL > 0, dn/dm < 0, dn/db < 0,
d(m-n)/dL = -dn/dL < 0, d(m-n)/dm = -dn/dm > 0.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Multiplicity of equilibria is discussed in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989).13
It is straightforward that the number of active traditional sectors m-n decreases as the population
size increases and/or as transaction conditions are improved. Hence, duality of economic
structure is endogenized.
The comparative statics can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: As population size increases and/or as general transaction conditions are
improved, the equilibrium number of active modern sectors, degree of urbanization, degree
of capital intensity of active modern firms, productivity, and per capita real income
increase. For a given general transaction condition and population size, the country with
more favorable geographical and institutional conditions for trade has higher degree of
industrialization than in other countries.
Suppose general transaction conditions are very bad in the initial time. Then no modern firm
operates in any country. As time goes by, general transaction conditions are improved, so that
some modern firms operate in the country with the smallest transaction cost coefficient c0 = s.
But other countries are not industrialized. As general transaction conditions are further improved,
those countries with slightly larger transaction cost coefficient start industrializing and the
number of active modern firms in each of the industrializing countries increases. As general
transaction conditions are further improved, those countries with the largest transaction cost
coefficients are eventually industrialized. This process goes on until all countries and all sectors
in each country are industrialized.14
3. Extension and Applications
In the industrialization process described in the preceding section, each less developed
country gradually duplicates the industrialization in the relatively more developed country in the
absence of international trade. This looks like that each less developed country carries out import
substitution strategy and relies on domestic market for industrialization. Because of positive
effect of population size on industrialization, as shown in (14), we can extend our model to the
analysis of international trade and export oriented industrialization. The opening up of
international trade will increase the population size in the integrated world market, thereby
promoting industrialization and economic development. But in our model transaction costs
counteract unlimited expansion of international trade. Hence, the degree of market integration
can be endogenized using the trade off between economies of scale and transaction costs.
Suppose M countries are divided between the developed world consisting of N countries and the
underdeveloped world with M-N countries. We now interpret L in (13) and (14) as the total
population size in the N developed countries. In each of the N countries, some modern sectors
operate and sell their produce to domestic as well as the world market. Each of the M-N less
developed countries does not trade with other countries and self-provides industrial goods by
local cottage firms.
4 The dividing line between the developed countries and the underdeveloped
countries is given by the zero profit condition for the active modern sector with the smallest
fixed cost in the marginal Nth country. This implies that profit in all other modern sectors with
larger fixed cost in this country are negative. Also profit in all modern sectors in M-N less
developed countries which have larger transaction cost coefficients than the marginal country are
negative. This zero profit condition is
                                                          
4 We need the assumption that migration from the less developed countries to the developed ones is prohibitively
expensive. Otherwise, all individuals in the less developed countries will migrate to the developed countries which15
(15) pN0 = (1-mN-b)xj-d = 0
where d is the smallest fixed cost in the modern sector producing good 0 and xj is the total
market demand for this good in the integrated world market consisting of N developed countries.
Now, the zero profit condition for the marginal firm in the integrated market can be
obtained by assuming the profit in modern sector n in country 0 which has the smallest
transaction cost coefficient c0 = s to be zero. If this firm cannot break even in the marginal sector
which has the largest fixed cost among all active modern sectors, the other countries with larger
transaction cost coefficients than country 0 cannot possibly break even in this sector. This zero
profit condition is
(16) p0n = (1-s-b)xj-gn = 0.
Using (15) and (16) to eliminate the total market demand xj, which must the same for all
industrial goods, we can identify the connection between the network size of international trade
N and the number of active modern sectors in the integrated world market, n.
(17) N = [(1-b)/m]-[d (1-b-s)/mgn], 
dN/dm = (¶N/¶m)+(¶N/¶n)(dn/dm) < 0
where ¶N/¶m < 0, ¶N/¶n > 0, and dn/dm < 0 due to (12).
Interpreting L in (9) as the population size in the integrated market with N developed
countries, (9), (15), and (16) determine the equilibrium n in the developed world in the extended
model. Beside (17), the rest of comparative statics is the same as in (14). In each of the M-N less
developed countries which are not involved in international trade because of a large transaction
cost coefficient ci (i ˛(N, M]) all industrial goods are supplied by traditional (or cottage,
                                                                                                                                                                                          
have better transaction condition. Also, we need the assumption that all individuals in the developed countries can
freely migrate between countries and they equally share ownership of all active modern firms. The two assumptions
are quite ad hoc. But they are essential for keeping the extended model tractable.16
handcraft) sectors. Per capita income is the same in all less developed countries, lower than in
the developed countries. The autarky equilibrium for each of those countries is





where Li is the population size of country i ˛(N, M]. We now assume that in the initial period m
is so large that ci is too large for any modern firm to break even in all countries i > 0. Hence,
only country 0 (the UK) has modern sectors. As time goes by, m decreases, the scope for trading
off economies of scale against transaction costs is enlarged, so that the modern sectors with low
fixed cost become profitable, this increases income and thereby demand, which makes more
modern firms become profitable. This higher degree of industrialization in the developed world
makes more less countries be willing to use international trade to exploit more economies of
scale, which extends overseas market for domestic produce in the developed countries, which in
turns attracts more participants of the network of trade. But increased transaction costs
counteract the positive feedback between the extent of the market and economies of scale that
can be exploited and between the number of countries involved in international trade and gains
from trade. A new equilibrium is established that balances the trade off between economies of
scale and transaction costs. Those countries with larger transaction cost coefficients and those
modern sectors that are more capital intensive are not involved in international trade in the early
stage of world development.
As general transaction conditions are further improved, the equilibrium number
(measure) of modern sectors n and the number of countries involved in industrialization and
international trade, N, increase. The newly industrializing countries produce and export goods of
low capital intensity and those old industrialized countries produce and export capital intensive17
goods. This process continues until the most capital intensive sectors are produced by the
modern sector and all countries are involved in the integrated world market. This is what
happened in the West Europe in the 18
th and 19
th century. Fig. 1 gives an intuitive illustration of
this spread of market led industrialization.
            
(a) UK started industrialization (b) Netherlands started
     in 1760  industrialization in 1790
     
(c) France started (d) Germany started (e) North Europe started
industrialization in 1815 industrialization in 1860 industrialization in 1870
Figure 1: Map of Industrialization in Europe in 18
th and 19
th Centuries18
Two types of dual structure
Our model endogenizes not only duality between modern and traditional sectors, but also
duality between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. As worldwide transaction conditions
are improved (m decreases) or population size increases, the comparative statics indicate that per
capita income increases for the developed countries involved in international trade, but per capita
income in the less developed countries which are still left out of the world market does not
change. Hence, inequality of per capita income between the developed and less developed
countries increases. This inequality decreases as the last less developed country jumps into the
world market.
If we assume that q differs between countries, then it is easy to show the existence of
Ricardian exogenous comparative advantages between countries. Hence, trade of agricultural and
industrial goods between the countries with different values of q can increase per capita real
income too. Then we can add trade flow of agricultural goods to Fig. 1, which then looks more
realistic.
Fig. 1, together with (13) and (17), captures a general equilibrium mechanism that entails
circular causation: each modern firm's profit and thereby its decision of being active is
determined by the network size of industrial linkages and trade flows (or the thickness of the
market), while the network size is determined by all firms' decisions on whether they participate
in this industrialization process. Each country's decision of being involved in the world market is
dependent not only on the size of the world market, N, but also on the degree of industrialization,
n, in the developed world, while the degree of industrialization and the network size of
international trade is determined by all countries' decisions on whether they participate in this
networking process. Our model shows that the notion of general equilibrium (fixed point) is a19
powerful vehicle for figuring out the networking mechanism in a decentralized market. This is
the essence of the idea of market led and "unbalanced" industrialization: the market plays a
sophisticated function in networking self-interested participants of the network of industrial
linkages and trade flows when all participants may not understand this function.
Import substitution versus export oriented industrialization
The import substitution strategy that was advocated by some development economists after the
WWII is like the industrialization process in the absence of international trade, described in (13)
and (14).
5 The networking process of international trade and industrialization described in the
extended model with M countries is consistent with export oriented industrialization. Suppose a
developed country (UK) has a small transaction cost coefficient, so that it runs many modern
sectors profitably. A less developed country has very large transaction cost coefficient, so that its
modern sectors are not profitable. Suppose that q is slightly smaller in the UK than in the less
developed country due to limited arable land. Then, the UK can receive marginal gains from
trade by exporting goods produced by the modern sectors. As general transaction conditions are
improved in all countries (due to commercialized production of steam engines or automobiles),
some modern sectors become marginally profitable in the less developed country. Hence, it can
start import substitution industrialization. The import substitution strategy works to the degree
that as m decreases, less developed countries will start industrializing one by one in the absence
of international trade. But the import substitution strategy artificially increases transaction cost
coefficient ci by imposing high tariffs, thereby missing faster industrialization that can be
generated by expansion of the network size of the world market. Hence, it is inferior to export
                                                          
5 See, for instance, Balassa (1980), Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986), Meier (1989, pp.297-306), and Bruton
(1998) for discussion of development strategies.20
oriented industrialization, which uses tariff reduction and free trade zone to reduce transaction
cost coefficient c.
Development trap
Suppose that m is a variable, its upper bound is m’ >> 1 and its lower bound is 1. Assume
further that per capita minimum consumption of the agricultural good is 1. We can show that in a
country if q is small enough to be close to 1 and the transaction cost coefficient c is very large,
then only one industrial good is produced in this country and it is not involved in international
trade. Hence, productivity and per capita real income in this country is very low. If agricultural
productivity parameter q is large in the temperate zone and is very small in the tropic zone
because of the difference in climate conditions documented in Gallup and Sachs (1998), then our
model predicts that tropic economies are more likely to be locked in the development trap.  If c is
small in this country, then this country can be pulled out of the development trap by international
trade and specialization in producing industrial goods. Hence, a bad climate condition alone is
not enough to lock a country in the development trap. Bad climate as well as bad transaction
conditions can lock a country in the development trap. The effects of transaction and
geographical conditions on development and trade performance are supported by historical
evidences documented in North (1958) and by empirical evidences provided in Barro (1997),
Easton and Walker (1997), Frye and Shleifer (1997), Gallup and Sachs (1998), Sachs and
Warner (1995, 1997).
If the agricultural productivity parameter q is interpreted as dependent on public health
condition in different regions, the above analysis, together with the differences in public health
conditions between the temperate and tropic zones documented in Gallup and Sachs (1998),21
implies also that the tropic zone is more likely to be locked in the development trap. If we
interpret marginal labor productivity of a modern firm, 1/b, as dependent on health condition in
different regions, then the comparative statics in (14) indicate that since the public health
condition in the temperate zone is better than in the tropic zone, the equilibrium degree of
industrialization, n, is higher in the former than in the latter.
In our story of development and trade, difference in transaction conditions explains
difference in trade dependence and in gains that different countries receive from trade.
Explaining economic development and trade by transaction efficiency may be considered as
tautology by some economists. But from (11) we can see that complicated substitution between
population size, L, transaction conditions m, marginal productivity parameter of good x, b, fixed
production cost, F, and taste parameter for final manufactured goods (income share of the final
manufactured goods), a, in raising the equilibrium degree of industrialization, n, can be
rigorously investigated using our model. Also, as transaction conditions are improved, total
transaction cost a(P+L)￿0
nmjdj/m = n
2a(P+L)/2m increases as trade connections and trade
volume increase. Here, the number of active modern sectors (and the number of goods produced
by the modern sectors) n and total income P+L are decreasing functions of the transaction cost
parameter m. This negative correlation between the transaction cost coefficient and total
transaction cost is far beyond tautology. North (1958) provides empirical evidence for positive
correlation between economic development and transaction conditions and North (1986)
provides empirical evidence for the positive correlation between economic development and
income share of the transacting costs.22
The results of the extended model are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2:
As transaction conditions are improved, and/or as the population size increases, the
following development phenomena concur. The equilibrium dividing line between the
developed world and less developed world moves in the direction that more less-developed
and self-sufficient countries are involved in the integrated developed world. In the
developed world, the number of operating modern firms increases, and per capita income,
trade dependence, and degree of urbanization increase. In this process inequality of income
distribution increases as dual structure emerges from the transitional stage and then
declines as the dual structure disappears. The countries with better transaction conditions
are involved in international trade before other countries are.
If we use the zero profit conditions in all active modern sectors to determine the prices of their
produce, then we can express the representative consumer's utility as a function of the degree of
industrialization, n. Maximizing the utility with respect to n yields the Pareto optimum degree of
industrialization which is higher than the equilibrium one. This is because the price mechanism
fails to transmit information of the production and transaction conditions of the modern firms to
consumers. In other words, consumers receive benefit of industrialization via dividend earnings,
but they allocate the same share of dividend earnings to buy a good produced by a modern or a
cottage firm because of the misinformation of price signals. In the Pareto optimum, each
consumer consumes more of produce of each modern sector than that of each cottage sector.
Slight differentiation between a good produced by the cottage firm and that by the modern firm23
will eliminate the distortions. But we will go to the regime of monopolistic competition which
causes another type of distortion.
A dynamic version of the model
Assume that the transaction condition parameter m in period t is determined by transaction
volume in period t-1. Hence,
(18) mt = g(mXt-1), g’(.) < 0, mXt-1 = k(nt-1), k’(.) > 0
where trade volume in the economy mXt-1 = a(P+nt-1L) is an increasing function of nt-1, due to
(13),  and k(.) is given in (13). This relationship between transaction condition and trade volume
implies that there are either learning by doing effects or increasing returns in trading activities.
But because of the complexity of the interplay between the extent of the market and economies
of scale that can be exploited, and interdependencies of many endogenous variables, in period t-1
a decision maker cannot make reasonably accurate forecast of trade volume in period t. Hence,
each decision maker’s horizon is only one period and she follows an adaptive decision rule. She
makes her decision in period t according to the value of transaction cost coefficient c that she
observes in this period.
Hence, the relationship between mt and the equilibrium nt is given by (5) and (13) as
(19) nt = h(mt), h’(.) < 0.
(18) and (19) together generate a difference equation that characterizes dynamics of mt, nt, and
other endogenous variables.
(20) nt = F(nt-1), F’(.) > 0.
Since the equilibrium value of n cannot be analytically solved, we need to simulate it on the
computer to see if this difference equation is stable or divergent. The gradual spread of24
industrialization process in this dynamic version of our model has formalized the essence of the
ideas on unbalanced industrialization, though this phrase does not accurately capture the essence
of gradual spread of market led industrialization. Certainly, the gradual spread of
industrialization is not Pareto optimal, because of myopic decisions. But it prevents mistakes and
distortions caused by incorrect forecasts and long horizon planning, in particular by central
planning which might infringe upon private property rights and destroy related incentives for
industrialization. Also, the gradual spread of market led industrialization may move to be closer
to the Pareto optimum industrialization pattern as time goes by, provided the difference equation
in (20) converges to the more efficient pattern of industrialization.
Suppose the gradual industrialization represented by (28) has already reached a relatively
efficient pattern of industrialization in a developed country (UK) or in a developed region (West
Europe). A less developed country may get free information about the efficient pattern of
industrialization. A mimicking process may generate big push industrialization by jumping over
the gradual evolutionary process. But there are two ways to carry out such big push
industrialization strategy.
If private entrepreneurs can take into account the feedback between m, n, profit, and
market demand, they can invest in fixed cost more than the optimum level suggested by the
current transaction and market conditions, a big push industrialization may occur (n
discontinuously jumps from 0 to a very large value) as the transaction condition parameter
reaches a threshold value. Also, the government may carry out a big push industrialization
program.
Taiwan's experience of industrialization after 1960 was more like the first market led big
push industrialization. Taiwan government mimics all successful institutional infrastructures from25
developed capitalist economies (she copied continental law from Japan and Germany, corporation
law from Britain, and other institutions from capitalist economies). But the government has carried
out a liberalization and internalization policy in order to give private sector freedom to copy
successful industrialization process.
6
The experience of the Soviet Union in the 1930s and that of China in the 1950s is a special
pattern of state led big push industrialization. The major features of this pattern are as follows.
7
Mimicking all successful patterns of industrialization in developed capitalist economies,
such as high saving rate, increasing income share of heavy industry, the Taylor scientific
management approach, mass production, standardization, comprehensive investment programs, and
internal organizational patterns of large corporations. However, the imitation was not through the
market and private property rights as happened in Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, the
imitation was conducted by the central planning system through infringements upon private
property rights. The precondition for its success is to mimic whatever succeed in a capitalist
economy. Many economists predicted that such a system could not succeed (see, for instance,
Mises, 1922). But they were surprised by the relatively successful industrialization in the Soviet
Union in the 1930s.
Despite of short-run success of the Soviet style big push industrialization, the fall of the
Soviet Union pronounced the long-run failure of this big push industrialization strategy, compared
to Taiwan's pattern of big push industrialization. As Sachs (1994) suggests, the fatal long-run
negative effects of the Soviet style state led big push industrialization via mimicking the successful
industrial pattern of the developed country and infringing upon private property rights will outweigh
                                                          
6 A comparison between mainland China and Taiwan's economic development can be found from Rabushka (1987).
China's experience of big push industrialization can be found from Riskin (1987).26
its short-run positive effect on economic development once the potential for mimicking has been
exhausted.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces the trade off between economies of scale and transaction costs into the MSV
model to endogenize the number of modern sectors. We have developed an approach to analyzing
the MSV model by specifying the zero profit condition for a marginal modern firm and keeping the
original flavor of the MSV model which is featured with the feedback loop between positive
dividend earning, the extent of the market, and economies of scale that can be exploited. However,
as transaction costs are introduced, big push industrialization will not occur unless transaction
conditions have a sudden big improvement. Our model predicts a gradual spread of industrialization
from the countries with better transaction conditions to other less developed countries, as general
transaction conditions are improved, or as a dynamic mechanism gradually gets more and more
countries involved in the increasingly more integrated world market. In this process inequality of
income between the developed and less developed countries increases as a dual structure emerges
and finally decreases as the dual structure disappears eventually. Also, the number of modern
sectors increases, the degree of trade dependence and urbanization increases, productivity of the
industrial sector increases, per capita income increases, the degree of market integration increases,
and the number of traditional sectors decreases.
This model formalizes the idea of unbalanced and market led industrialization. It also
predicts possible big push industrialization for late comers who may mimic the relatively efficient
industrial pattern that has been realized in the developed economy. But our model suggests that the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Zaleski (1980) have documented the role of mimicry by Soviet planners of Western production patterns. Lenin's works,
for instance (1939), indicate that he was very familiar with the features of industrialization in a developed capitalist27
feedback loop between dividend earning (based on private property rights to residual returns of
firms), the extent of the market, and economies of scale that can be exploited is essential for
successful industrialization though the networking function of the market is not perfect. If big push
industrialization is realized by destroying this wonderful market mechanism, the positive effects of
mimicking will be outweighed by the negative effects of absence of right incentives on economic
development in the long-run.
  A shortcoming of our model is that it predicts a scale effect that productivity of an active
modern firm increases if and only if the average size of active modern firms increases. This
prediction is rejected by empirical evidences provided in Liu and Yang (forthcoming). As shown
in Shi and Yang (1995, 1998), Liu and Yang (forthcoming), and Sun and Lio (1997), a possible
way to avoid this scale effect is to specify local increasing returns instead of global economies of
scale. Their models of endogenous specialization and industrialization have formalized the
argument of irrelevance of the size of the firm, proposed by Coase (1937), Cheung (1983), Stigler
(1953), and Young (1928). According to this argument, if division of labor develops between
firms, productivity increases while average size of firms declines (outsourcing, contracting out,
disintegration, focusing on core competence). If division of labor develops within each firm, then
the average size of firms and productivity increase simultaneously. However, these models are
completely symmetric and cannot explore the implications of asymmetric production and
transaction conditions for industrialization. Hence, a combination of approach developed in this
paper and the model formalizing the argument of irrelevance of the size of the firm may be an
interesting research agenda in the future.
It needs more research on the question: can further modification of model specification
avoid the distortion of relative prices of modern and cottage sectors in equilibrium? Casual
                                                                                                                                                                                          
economy.28
observation indicates that many companies understand the negative network effect of greedy
profit maximization pricing. They practice "generous pricing" rule which may pay internet
traffickers for their clicking an internet message or give free email services or free computers for
networking clients. It seems that self-interested decisions in decentralized market are much
smarter than the simple profit maximization pricing in our model that generates Pareto inefficient
degree of industrialization and multiple equilibria in the MSV model.29
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